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A CONCEPT OF WEIGHTED CONNECTIVITY
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Abstract. The introduction of a {0, 1}-valued game associated to a connected graph
allows us to assign to each node a value of weighted connectivity according to the diﬀerent
solutions that for the cooperative games are obtained by means of the semivalues. The
marginal contributions of each node to the coalitions diﬀerentiate an active connectivity
from another reactive connectivity, according to whether the node is essential to obtain
the connection or it is the obstacle for the connection between the nodes in the coalition.
Diverse properties of this concept of connectivity can be derived.
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1 Introduction
The graph concept is a mathematical model for communication networks constituted by nodes
or vertices connected by means of connection channels, that generically we name edges. Each
node is directly connected to other nodes by means of edges or indirectly through paths involving
diﬀerent edges and intermediate nodes. The geometry of the edges, in addition to their number,
determines the importance of each node in the system of the graph, so that it seems reasonable
to study the contribution of each node to the set of connections. In this work we propose
to associate to each connected graph a cooperative game. A desirable characteristic for the
game is that it is simple. For this reason, a two-valued game is constructed. Values 1 and 0
are respectively associated with the connected and not connected coalitions according to the
graph.
Aplimat - Journal of Applied Mathematics
2 Connected graphs and games
A graph Γ = (N,E) is a pair where N is a ﬁnite set of nodes and E = E(Γ) is a set of non-
ordered pairs of diﬀerent nodes called edges and denoted by i : j. From now on we suppose
N = {1, 2, ..., n} and we denote by G(N) the set of all graphs with these n nodes. We say that
two nodes related by an edge are adjacent nodes. A path between two nodes is a series of edges
that link both nodes in such a way that each edge and its following edge have a common node.
A graph is a connected graph when, for every pair of nodes, there exists a path between both
nodes. We denote by CG(N) the set of all connected graphs on N .
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair (N, v), where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a
ﬁnite set of players and v : 2N → R is the so-called characteristic function, which assigns to
every coalition S ⊆ N a real number v(S), the worth of coalition S, and satisﬁes the condition
v(∅) = 0. We denote by GN the set of all cooperative games on N . Given a set of players N ,
we identify each game (N, v) with its characteristic function v.
Definition 2.1 We deﬁne the cooperative game vΓ ∈ GN [1] associated to the connected graph
Γ ∈ CG(N) by vΓ(S) = 1 if S ⊆ N is connected by graph Γ and |S| > 1, and vΓ(S) = 0
otherwise.
Value 1 is associated to success and value 0 to failure in the connection of all members of
each coalition of nodes S. Γ is a connected graph, then vΓ(N) = 1. Value vΓ({i}) = 0, ∀i ∈ N ,
responds to the consideration of which isolated elements do not enter in communication with
any other node.
A function Ψ : GN → RN is called a solution for the cooperative games in GN and represents
a method to measure the negotiation strength of the players in the game or a way to emphasize
the importance of the role that each one of them carries out. The space RN is the so-called
allocation space or payoﬀ vector space.
In order to calibrate the importance of each player i in the diﬀerent coalitions S, we can
look at its marginal contribution, i.e., v(S) − v(S \ {i}). If these marginal contributions are
weighted by means of equal coeﬃcients depending only on the size of the coalitions, we arrive
at the solution concept known as semivalue, introduced by Dubey, Neyman and Weber in 1981.
These solutions Ψ : GN → RN are characterized [3] by means of four axioms:
A1. Linearity. Ψ[λu + μv] = λΨ[u] + μΨ[v], ∀u, v ∈ GN , ∀λ, μ ∈ R.
A2. Symmetry. Ψπi[πv] = Ψi[v], ∀v ∈ GN , ∀i ∈ N, ∀π permutation of N , where game πv is
deﬁned by (πv)(πS) = v(S), ∀S ⊆ N .
A3. Monotonicity. v monotonic ⇒ Ψi[v] ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N.
A4. Projection. Ψi[v] = v({i}), ∀v ∈ AN , where AN denotes the set of additive games within
GN : games v such that v(S ∪ T ) = v(S) + v(T ) for S ∩ T = ∅ and S, T ⊆ N.
It has been proved in [3] that there exists a one-to-one map between the semivalues on GN
and the weighting vectors (ps), s = 1, . . . , n, that verify conditions
n∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
ps = 1 and ps ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
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The number of coalitions of size s that contain each player i ∈ N is (n−1
s−1
)
. The above
conditions give a probability distribution on the diﬀerent coalitions that contain each player,
assuming equal weight for equal size.
This way, the payoﬀ to each player i in a game v ∈ GN by a semivalue ψ with weighting
coeﬃcients (ps), s = 1, . . . , n, is a weighted sum of its marginal contributions
ψi[v] =
∑
S⊆N
ps[v(S)− v(S \ {i})], where s = |S|.
We denote the set of all semivalues deﬁned on GN by Sem(GN). Well known solutions for
cooperative games as the Shapley value [6] and the Banzhaf value [2, 5] are semivalues.
3 Weighted connectivity
Definition 3.1 We call weighted connectivity [1], according to semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN), of
the node i in the connected graph Γ to the payoﬀ that according to the semivalue ψ corresponds
to the player i in the associated game vΓ. We denote it by ψi[vΓ], ∀i ∈ N .
Theorem 3.2 The weighted connectivity ψi[vΓ] of a node i in a connected graph Γ can be
decomposed in an active connectivity ψi[vΓ]
+ and a reactive connectivity ψi[vΓ]
−:
ψi[vΓ] = ψi[vΓ]
+ + ψi[vΓ]
− where
ψi[vΓ]
+ =
n∑
s=2
γsps with γs = |{S ⊆ N | i ∈ S, |S| = s, vΓ(S) = 1 and vΓ(S \ {i}) = 0}| and
ψi[vΓ]
− = −
n−1∑
s=3
δsps with δs = |{S ⊂ N | i ∈ S, |S| = s, vΓ(S) = 0 and vΓ(S \ {i}) = 1}|.
To prove the Theorem it suﬃces to consider that in cases vΓ(S) = vΓ(S \ {i}) = 1 and
vΓ(S) = vΓ(S \{i}) = 0 the marginal contributions vanish. In the ﬁrst situation both coalitions
are connected by Γ, whereas in the second situation the nodes are connected neither in S nor in
S \ {i}. Case vΓ(S) = 1, vΓ(S \ {i}) = 0 supposes the loss of connection in S when we remove
node i. The node i is essential in the connection of the nodes in S. Finally, vΓ(S) = 0 with
vΓ(S \ {i}) = 1 shows the position of node i as an obstacle for the connection of the nodes in
S, since coalition S \ {i} is connected by Γ.
Example 3.3 In the set of nodes N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, we consider the graph Γ whose set of
edges is E(Γ) = {1 : 2, 1 : 4, 2 : 3, 2 : 6, 3 : 4, 3 : 5, 4 : 5, 5 : 6}.
For node 1, coalitions S that compute in active connectivity are {1, 2}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 4},
{1, 2, 4, 5} and {1, 2, 4, 6}, whereas for the reactive one they are {1, 3, 5}, {1, 5, 6} and {1, 3, 5, 6}.
Then: ψ1[vΓ]
+ = 2p2 + p3 + 2p4, ψ1[vΓ]
− = −2p3 − p4 and ψ1[vΓ] = 2p2 − p3 + p4.
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Similar computations allow us to determine the weighted connectivity for the remaining
nodes so that
ψ[vΓ] = (2p2 − p3 + p4, 3p2 + 2p3 + 5p4 + 2p5, 3p2 + 2p3 + 3p4, 3p2 + p3 + 3p4 + p5,
3p2 + p3 + 3p4 + p5, 2p2 − p3 + p4).
The symmetrical role of nodes 1 and 6, and 4 and 5, respectively, gives rise to equal alloca-
tions by every semivalue. Now, by using diverse semivalues, we can oﬀer relative measures of
the importance of the nodes in the connection scheme of the graph. If we choose the Shapley
value Sh on games with six players (weighting coeﬃcients p1 = p6 = 1/6, p2 = p5 = 1/30 and
p3 = p4 = 1/60):
Sh[vΓ] = (0.0667, 0.2833, 0.1833, 0.2000, 0.2000, 0.0667).
According to the Banzhaf value β (weighting coeﬃcients ps = 1/32, s = 1, . . . , 6), we have:
β[vΓ] = (0.0625, 0.3750, 0.2500, 0.2500, 0.2500, 0.0625).
Finally, if we denote by ψ∗ the semivalue with coeﬃcients p1 = 32/243, p2 = 16/243,
p3 = 8/243, p4 = 4/243, p5 = 2/243 and p6 = 1/243, the weighted connectivity of the nodes in
graph Γ is
ψ∗[vΓ] = (0.1152, 0.3621, 0.3128, 0.2881, 0.2881, 0.1152).
The weighting coeﬃcients of semivalue ψ∗ are in geometric progression with ratio 1/2:
semivalue ψ∗ belongs to the family of binomial semivalues, as they were introduced in [4].
4 General properties
Several properties of this concept of weighted connectivity can be derived. The following
theorems introduce some of them, which can be easily proved from the deﬁnitions.
Given a node i in a graph Γ, the degree of i, denoted as deg(i), is the cardinality of the set
of adjacent nodes to i. The coeﬃcient p2 of any semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN) weights the marginal
contributions to two-person coalitions. In the associated game to graph Γ, the two-person
coalitions are formed by the own node i and all its adjacent nodes. Thus, the weight p2 appears
in the weighted connectivity of node i so many times as deg(i).
We say that two graphs Γ1 and Γ2 are isomorphic iﬀ there exists a one-to-one map between
the respective sets of nodes, f : N1 → N2, that preserves adjacencies, i.e., i : j ∈ E(Γ1) ⇔
f(i) : f(j) ∈ E(Γ2). The map f is an isomorphism between the graphs Γ1 and Γ2.
Theorem 4.1 If Γ1 and Γ2 are isomorphic graphs by map f , then
ψf(i)(vΓ2) = ψi(vΓ1), ∀i ∈ N1, ∀ψ ∈ Sem(GN).
In particular, if two nodes play a symmetrical role in a given graph Γ, we can deﬁne a one-
to-one map between the own nodes, so that both nodes obtain the same weighted connectivity
by every semivalue.
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Theorem 4.2 Let i be a node in a graph Γ ∈ CG(N). If deg(i) = n−1, n−2, then the reactive
connectivity of vertex i vanish.
Theorem 4.3 Given a semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN) with weighting coeﬃcients (ps), s = 1, . . . , n,
we consider the set CG(N) of all connected graphs with nodes in N . Then, for every node
i ∈ N ,
max
Γ∈CG(N)
ψi[vΓ] = 1− p1.
We say that a node i in a graph with deg(i) = 1 is an antenna. The unique node adjacent
to an antenna is the base of the antenna.
The star graph with n−1 points Sn−1 is formed by n−1 antennas and a unique node that is
the base of all antennas or star center. We denote the set of nodes of Sn−1 by N = {1}∪{2, ..., n},
where the distinguished node 1 is its center.
Corollary 4.4 Given a semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN) with weighting coeﬃcients (ps), s = 1, . . . , n,
the maximum value of weighted connectivity of the nodes in graphs of CG(N) is attained in the
center node of Sn−1.
Theorem 4.5 Given a semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN) with weighting coeﬃcients (ps), s = 1, . . . , n,
we consider the set CG(N) of all connected graphs with nodes in N . Then, for every node
i ∈ N ,
min
Γ∈CG(N)
ψi[vΓ] = p2 −
n−1∑
s=3
(
n− 2
s− 1
)
ps.
In the set of nodes N , we call complete graph KN to the graph that is formed by the
(
n
2
)
possible edges.
Corollary 4.6 Given a semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN) with weighting coeﬃcients (ps), s = 1, . . . , n,
the minimum value of weighted connectivity of the nodes in graphs of CG(N) is attained in an
antenna node i with base in any node of KN{i}.
Corollary 4.7 Given a semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN) with weighting coeﬃcients (ps), s = 1, . . . , n,
and a graph Γ ∈ CG(N), the weighted connectivity of an antenna node i with base in a node b
is a value independent from the number of edges between the base b and the remaining nodes.
5 Connectivity of graph families
In this section we consider the weighted connectivity of some families of graphs whose edges
have a disposition with geometric regularity. The graph families whose connectivity we want
to evaluate have an element on each set of nodes with diﬀerent cardinality: complete graphs
KN , star graphs Sn−1 with n− 1 points or cycle graphs formed by a unique closed way or cycle
going through the n nodes.
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Theorem 5.1 For every semivalue ψ ∈ Sem(GN), |N | ≥ 3, with weighting coeﬃcients (ps),
s = 1, . . . , n, the weighted connectivity has the following values.
(a) Complete graph: ψi[vKN ] = (n− 1)p2, ∀i ∈ N.
(b) Star graph:
ψ1[vSn−1 ] = 1− p1, 1 star center;
ψi[vSn−1 ] = p2, i = 2, ..., n star points.
(c) Cycle graph:
ψi[vC4 ] = 2p2 + p3, i = 1, 2, 3, 4;
ψi[vCn ] = 2p2 +
∑n−2
s=3 (2s− n− 1)ps + (n− 3)pn−1, ∀i ∈ N, n ≥ 5.
6 Conclusion
Semivalues form a wide family of solutions for cooperative games whose allocations to the
players are frequently used in Game Theory. The introduction of a cooperative game associated
to each connected graph has turned out to be a useful tool to compute weighted connectivity of
the nodes by means of the family of semivalues. Several properties of this concept of connectivity
have been obtained.
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